Accepted author's version, cite as: Pylkkänen P. (2019) Quantum Theory and the Place of Mind in the Causal Order of Things. In: de Barros J., Montemayor C. (eds) Quanta and Mind. Synthese Library (Studies in Epistemology, Logic, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science), vol 414. Springer, Cham. Doi: 10.1007/978-3-030-21908-6_14 Quantum	Theory	and	the	Place	of	Mind	in	the	Causal	Order	of	Things Paavo	Pylkkänen Department	of	Philosophy,	History	and	Art	Studies,	University	of	Helsinki,	Finland and Department	of	Cognitive	Neuroscience	and	Philosophy,	University	of	Skövde,	Sweden E-mail:	paavo.pylkkanen@helsinki.fi Web:	https://philpapers.org/s/Paavo%20Pylkkanen Abstract.	The	received	view	in	physicalist	philosophy	of	mind	assumes	that causation	can	only	take	place	at	the	physical	domain	and	that	the	physical domain	is	causally	closed.	It	is	often	thought	that	this	leaves	no	room	for	mental states	qua	mental	to	have	a	causal	influence	upon	the	physical	domain,	leading	to epiphenomenalism	and	the	problem	of	mental	causation. However,	in	recent philosophy	of	causation	there	has	been	growing	interest	in	a	line	of	thought	that can	be	called	causal	anti-fundamentalism:	causal	notions	cannot	play	a	role	in physics,	because	the	fundamental	laws	of	physics	are	radically	different	from causal	laws. Causal	anti-fundamentalism	seems	to	challenge	the	received	view	in physicalist	philosophy	of	mind	and	thus	raises	the	possibility	of	there	being genuine	mental	causation	after	all. This	paper	argues	that	while	causal	antifundamentalism	provides	a	possible	route	to	mental	causation,	we	have	reasons to	think	that	it	is	incorrect. Does	this	mean	that	we	have	to	accept	the	received view	and	give	up	the	hope	of	genuine	mental	causation?	I	will	suggest	that	the ontological	interpretation	of	quantum	theory	provides	us	both	with	a	view	about the	nature	of	causality	in	fundamental	physics,	as	well	as	a	view	how	genuine mental	causation	can	be	compatible	with	our	fundamental	(quantum)	physical ontology. 1.	Introduction The	received	view	in	physicalist	philosophy	of	mind	states	that	causation	can only	take	place	at	the	physical	level	because	everything	that	happens	in	the world	is	ultimately	determined	by	the	laws	of	physics	and	the	physical	domain	is causally	closed	(cf.	Sundström	and	Vassen	2017). This	implies	that	non-physical entities	cannot	have	any	physical	effects.	If	mind	(whether	conscious	or unconscious)	is	taken	to	be	non-physical	(as	is	often	done),	then	it	cannot	have any	physical	effects,	and	we	end	up	with	epiphenomenalism,	the	view	that mental	properties	exist	but	have	no	causal	influence	upon	the	physical	world. The	place	of	mind 2 Epiphenomenalism	is	widely	thought	to	be	an	unsatisfactory	view	and	there have	been	many	attempts	to	avoid	it	(see	Robb	and	Heil	2018).	In	this	paper	I will	discuss	two	ways	to	challenge	the	received	view,	and	to	save	mental causation. The	first	is	provided	by	causal	anti-fundamentalism,	a	view	which	states that	causation	is	not	part	of	the	fundamental	physical	ontology	of	the	world. If causal	anti-fundamentalism	is	correct,	then	the	received	view	is	mistaken. Moreover,	it	has	been	suggested	that	causal	anti-fundamentalism	is	compatible with	the	idea	that	fundamental	physical	facts	ground	higher-level	causal	facts, including	those	involving	consciousness	(Blanchard	2016:	256).	Conscious experiences	could	then	be	seen	as	local	events	which	determine	events	in	their future. A	second	way	to	challenge	the	received	view	is	opened	up	by	the ontological	interpretation	of	quantum	theory	(Bohm	and	Hiley	1987,	1993).	This interpretation	suggests	that	the	wave	function	in	quantum	theory	describes	a new	type	field	which	contains	active	information,	which	latter	is	a	fundamental, causal	factor	organizing	the	motion	of	physical	particles.	Bohm	(1990)	proposed that	by	extending	this	quantum	ontology	in	a	natural	way	one	can	show	how mental	properties	can	influence	matter.	If	Bohm's	proposal	is	correct	the received	view	is	either	mistaken,	or	else	the	concept	"physical"	in	the	received view	needs	to	be	extended	to	include	active	information	and	possibly mind/consciousness	(which	are	traditionally	often	taken	to	be	non-physical entities). 2.	Causal	anti-fundamentalism Philosophers	of	mind	and	neuroscientists	typically	assume	that	we	have	a	clear understanding	of	the	nature	of	causality	in	the	physical	domain.	But,	in	fact,	there is	a	venerable	tradition,	dating	back	to	Russell's	(1913)	causal	antifundamentalism,	arguing	that	causal	notions	can	play	no	legitimate	role	in	how physics	represents	the	world	(Frisch	2012;	Price	and	Corry	eds.	2007). Causal anti-fundamentalism	has	been	succinctly	summarized	in	a	recent	workshop description	by	Sundström	and	Vassen	(2017): The	place	of	mind 3 ...causal	notions	cannot	play	a	role	in	physics,	because	the	fundamental	laws	of physics	are	radically	different	from	causal	laws.	Causal	laws	typically	describe how	local	events	determine	events	in	their	future;	for	example,	a	causal	law	can connect	smoking	to	later	occurrences	of	cancer.	By	contrast,	physical	laws connect	the	entirety	of	physical	reality	in	a	time-symmetric	manner:	the	entire state	of	the	universe	at	a	certain	time	equally	determines	the	relative	past	and the	future	of	the	universe.	It	therefore	appears	reasonable	to	situate	causation	in the	higher	levels	of	science	where	local	events	are	studied	in	a	time-directed manner,	such	as	biology	and	economy. So,	causal	anti-fundamentalism	is	the	thesis	that	causation	is	not	part	of	the fundamental	physical	ontology	of	the	world. If	true,	this	entails	that	causation	is not	as	central	a	feature	of	the	world	as	ordinarily	thought. But	as	was	noted above,	it	has	been	suggested	that	causal	anti-fundamentalism	is	compatible	with the	existence	of	causal	facts	as	non-fundamental	features	of	the	world	grounded in	fundamental	physical	facts	(Blanchard	2016:	256;	cf.	Cartwright	1979).	I suggest	that	causal	facts	involving	conscious	experiences	can	also	be	seen	as such	features.	This	suggests	a	view	in	which	conscious	experiences	can	be	seen as	local	events	which	determine	events	in	their	future	(in	a	similar	manner	as with	causal	laws	in	special	sciences	such	as	biology	and	economy).	Physics	(and the	causal	closure	of	the	physical	domain)	would	no	longer	be	an	obstacle	to mental	causation.	On	the	contrary:	fundamental	physical	facts	would	now	ground the	causal	facts	involving	conscious	experiences!1 Let	us	summarize	our	discussion	so	far.	According	to	the	received	physicalist view	there	is	no	room	for	mental	causation,	because	all	goings	on	in	the	world are	ultimately	determined	by	physics	and	physics	itself	is	causally	closed.	In contrast,	according	to	the	view	inspired	by	causal	anti-fundamentalism	the physical	world	is	not	governed	by	any	fundamental	relation	of	cause	and	effect. 1	Metaphysical	grounding	is,	of	course,	a	subtle	topic	in	contemporary	metaphysics,	and	we	will not	here	enter	into	a	discussion	about	what	exactly	it	might	mean	when	one	says	that fundamental	physical	facts	ground	causal	facts. But	see	Bliss	and	Trogdon	2016.	An	additional challenge	is	to	spell	out	how	physical	facts	could	ground	non-physical,	conscious	facts	(thanks	to Tuomas	Tahko	for	pointing	out	this	challenge). The	place	of	mind 4 But	one	can	still	hold	that	fundamental	physical	facts	ground	higher-level	causal facts,	including	those	involving	consciousness.	Conscious	experiences	can	then be	seen	as	local	events	which	determine	events	in	their	future.	Mental	causation is	possible! Is	this	too	good	to	be	true?	It	is	true	that	causal	anti-fundamentalism,	when suitably	interpreted,	gives	us	mental	causation	in	some	sense.	But	it	also	implies that	causal	facts	(including	those	involving	conscious	experiences)	are	nonfundamental.	One	might	worry	whether	this	is	too	deflationist	a	view	of	(mental) causation.	Also,	causal	anti-fundamentalism	is	admittedly	weird,	given	the	way we	have	traditionally	been	thinking	about	the	laws	of	physics. Is	it	really	the case	that	the	physical	world	is	not	governed	by	any	fundamental	relation	of cause	and	effect? 3.	Is	causal	anti-fundamentalism	correct? Remember	that	causal	anti-fundamentalism	claims	that	the	fundamental	laws	of physics	are	radically	different	from	causal	laws.	Allegedly,	one	important difference	is	that	while	causal	laws	typically	describe	how	local	events	determine events	in	their	future,	physical	laws	connect	the	entirety	of	physical	reality.	But do	physical	laws	really	connect	the	entirety	of	physical	reality?	In	the	spirit	of scientific	metaphysics,	let	us	here	consider	how	a	physicist	might	answer	the question.	When	discussing	causality	and	chance	in	modern	physics	David	Bohm proposed	in	1957	that	there	is	no	known	fundamental	physical	law	that	would be	able	to	take	into	account	the	complete	state	of	the	world: ...every	real	causal	relationship,	which	necessarily	operates	in	a	finite	context, has	been	found	to	be	subject	to	contingencies	arising	outside	the	context	in question.	(1957/1984:	3) If	Bohm	is	correct,	perhaps	the	fundamental	laws	of	physics	are	not	radically different	from	causal	laws,	and	there	is	causation	in	fundamental	physics	after	all (for	a	brief	discussion	of	Bohm's	view,	see	Andersen	et	al.	2018). The	place	of	mind 5 What	about	time-symmetry?	Another	reason	why	causal	antifundamentalism	claims	that	the	fundamental	laws	of	physics	are	radically different	from	causal	laws	has	to	do	with	time-symmetry.	Causal	laws	typically describe	how	local	events	determine	events	in	their	future.	But	physical	laws connect	the	entirety	of	physical	reality	in	a	time-symmetric	manner.	The	idea	is that	the	entire	state	of	the	universe	at	a	certain	time	equally	determines	the relative	past	and	the	future	of	the	universe. Let	as	again	consider	the	issue	in	the	light	of	Bohm's	thinking	about	physics. When	Bohm	in	his	1951	text-book	Quantum	theory	discusses	time-symmetry	he notes	that	classical	theory	is	prescriptive	and	not	causal.	He	points	out, consistently	with	causal	anti-fundamentalism,	that	in	classical	physics	the	idea	of forces	as	causes	of	events	became	unnecessary	and	almost	meaningless. [this	is	so]	because	both	the	past	and	the	future	of	the	entire	system	are	determined completely	by	the	equations	of	motion	of	all	the	particles,	coupled	with	their positions	and	velocities	at	any	one	instant	of	time.	Thus,	we	can	no	more	say	that	the future	is	caused	by	the	past	than	we	can	say	that	the	past	is	caused	by	the	future. Instead,	we	say	that	the	motion	of	all	particles	in	space	and	time	is	prescribed	by	a set	of	rules,	i.e.	the	differential	equations	of	motion,	which	involve	only	these	spacetime	motions	alone.	(1951:	151) But	what	about	the	quantum	theory? Here	Bohm	makes	a	point	which	seems	to challenge	causal	anti-fundamentalism	in	a	profound	way: Whereas	classical	theory	can	be	expressed	in	terms	of	a	set	of	prescriptive	rules relating	space-time	motions	at	different	times,	quantum	theory	cannot	be	so expressed.	Energy	and	momentum	(and	therefore,	the	causal	factors)	cannot	be eliminated	in	terms	of	velocities	and	positions	of	the	component	particles.	The quantum	theoretical	concept	of	causality,	therefore,	differs	from	its	classical counterpart.	It	must	necessarily	describe	the	relationships	between	space-time events	as	being	"caused"	by	factors	existing	within	matter	(i.e.,	momenta).	These are	on	the	same	fundamental	and	not	further	analyzable	footing	as	that	of	space and	time	themselves.	(1951:	157) The	place	of	mind 6 Bohm	acknowledges	that	in	quantum	theory	these	causal	factors	control	only	a statistical	trend	in	the	course	of	space-time	events.	But	he	notes	further	that	it	is just	this	property	of	incomplete	determinism	that	prevents	the	causal	factors	from becoming	redundant.	This,	he	says,	gives	a	real	content	to	the	concept	of	causality in	quantum	theory. So,	if	Bohm	is	correct,	causal	anti-fundamentalism	is	incorrect	and	there	is causation	in	the	physical	world. This	so,	first	of	all,	because	each	known fundamental	physical	law	operates	in	a	finite	context,	and	secondly	because	in quantum	theory,	energy	and	momentum	(and	therefore,	the	causal	factors) cannot	be	eliminated	in	terms	of	velocities	and	positions	of	the	component particles	(unlike	in	Newtonian	physics). Note,	however,	that	what	we	have	just	reported	above	comes	from Bohm's	1951	textbook	Quantum	theory	where	he	was	trying	to	explicate	a version	of	the	usual,	"Copenhagen"	interpretation	(his	explication	is	fairly	similar to	the	approach	of	Wolfgang	Pauli).	But	as	is	well	known,	Bohm	himself published	an	alternative	interpretation	of	quantum	theory	in	1952.	This interpretation	(or	"the	Bohm	theory")	assumed	that	an	electron	has simultaneously	a	well-defined	position	and	velocity	and	is	guided	by	a	new	type of	field	(mathematically	described	by	the	wave	function	Ψ). According	to	the usual	interpretation	of	quantum	theory,	the	wave	function	Ψ	does	not	describe an	individual	quantum	system	directly.	Rather,	Ψ	describes	our	knowledge	of	the quantum	system	to	be	observed	(typically	in	terms	of	probabilities).	In	contrast, according	to	Bohm's	1952	theory,	Ψ	describes	an	objectively	real	field,	guiding	a particle	such	as	an	electron. What	is	the	role	of	causality	in	the	Bohm	theory?	A	minimalist	version	of the	theory	(called	"Bohmian	mechanics")	expresses	quantum	theory	as	a	"firstorder"	theory	in	terms	of	velocities	(see	Goldstein	2013). As	far	as	I	can	judge, this	is	similar	to	classical	physics	in	that	causality	(energy,	momentum)	can	be eliminated	if	one	wishes. In	some	versions	of	Bohmian	mechanics	the	wave function	is	assumed	to	be	law-like.	So	it	seems	that	causality	can	be	eliminated just	as	in	classical	physics!2	However,	Bohm	and	Hiley	developed	Bohm's	1952 2	As	I	am	not	a	physicist,	I	offer	these	proposals	tentatively,	to	be	discussed	in	more	detail	by those	physicists	specialized	in	Bohmian	mechanics. The	place	of	mind 7 theory	into	another	direction	("the	ontological	interpretation"),	where	the	role	of the	so	called	quantum	potential	energy	is	important. In	this	picture	it	may	be possible	to	retain	energy	as	irreducible	and	thus	"genuine"	causality	in	quantum mechanics.3 The	above	suggests	that	there	are	certain	ironies	in	the	question	quantum theory	and	causality. It	seems	that	the	usual	interpretation	of	quantum	theory implies	that	(statistical)	causality	is	irreducible,	ironically,	because	of	the uncertainty	principle.	However,	recent	developments	in	the	interpretation	of quantum	theory	(e.g.	Bohmian	mechanics)	may	eliminate	causality	from fundamental	physics	(ironically,	because	of	determinism,	just	as	happened	in Newtonian	physics). But	there	is	the	possibility	that	in	Bohm	and	Hiley's ontological	interpretation,	with	its	emphasis	on	quantum	potential	energy,	we can	retain	genuine	causality. Let	us	now	return	to	the	issue	of	mental	causation. We	have	noted	that	if Bohm	and	Hiley's	interpretation	is	correct,	and	includes	an	irreducible	form	of quantum	potential	energy,	then	there	is	causation	in	the	fundamental	physical level	and	causal	anti-fundamentalism	is	incorrect. But	how	can	we	then	have mental	causation?	Doesn't	the	principle	of	the	causal	closure	of	the	physical domain	apply	to	the	Bohm-Hiley	scheme	as	well,	thus	leaving	no	room	for	mental properties	qua	mental	to	have	an	effect	upon	the	physical? Here	I	suggest	that	we	consider	Bohm	and	Hiley's	(1993)	suggestion	that	the ontological	interpretation	can	be	extended. So	let	us	move	on	to	examine	the ontological	interpretation	and	the	way	its	extension	might	allow	for	mental causation. 4.	Extending	the	ontological	interpretation	of	quantum	theory According	to	the	ontological	interpretation	of	quantum	theory	quantum processes	are	guided	by	a	field	containing	active	information	(described	by	the wave	function	Ψ,	expressed	in	terms	of	the	quantum	potential).	This	involves	a 3	Again,	I	am	offering	this	proposal	tentatively	as	a	philosopher,	to	be	discussed	in	more	detail	by physicists. The	place	of	mind 8 new	type	of	causation	which	we	may	call	informational	causation.	This information	is	radically	holistic	–	it	enables	non-locality	and	irreducible	objective wholeness	of	a	many-body	system. It	is	important	to	realize	that	Bohmian	active	information	is	not	Shannon information. The	idea	is	that	the	form	of	the	quantum	field	(described	by	the wave	function)	enfolds	information	about	the	environment	(e.g.	slits),	and	this information	then	literally	IN-FORMS	the	movement	of	the	particle	through	the quantum	potential. The	information	is	potentially	active	everywhere	where	the quantum	potential	non-zero,	but	actually	active	only	where	the	particle is. Without	such	actual	activity	of	"in-forming"	the	information	would	have	no causal	powers. So	in	this	picture	there	needs	to	be	actually	active	information for	there	to	be	any	causally	efficacious	information	at	all. Bohm	himself	(1990)	proposed	that	active	information	can	be	seen	as	a "primitive	mind-like	quality"	of	elementary	particles,	suggesting	a	view	that	we may	call	Bohmian	panprotopsychism	(see	Pylkkänen,	forthcoming). The	key principle	here	is	that	mental	processes	involve	"activity	of	form"	rather	than "activity	of	substance".	When	you	read	the	newspaper,	you	do	not	need	to	eat	the paper,	you	abstract	the	form	that	is	carried	or	enfolded	in	the	movement	of	light waves. That	form,	when	taken	up	by	the	nervous	system	and	interpreted	can give	rise	to	a	conscious	experience	of	meaning	of	the	information. Analogously, the	electron	is	not	pushed	and	pulled	by	the	quantum	wave. Rather,	it	is	able	to respond	to	the	form	of	the	quantum	wave. It	is	"mind-like"	in	this	sense. Note that	Bohm	thought	it	obvious	that	an	electron	is	not	(phenomenally)	conscious (Bohm	1990). But	we	could	ask	whether	the	electron	is	in	some	sense "perceiving"	(unconsciously)	its	environment	via	the	quantum	field. While	many are	still	likely	to	see	pan(proto)psychism	as	"a	complete	myth,	a	comforting piece	of	utter	balderdash"	(McGinn	2006:	93),	it	has	become	a	subject	of	intense discussion	in	contemporary	philosophy	(see	Strawson	2006;	Goff	et	al.	2017; Pylkkänen,	forthcoming). How	does	mental	causation	work	in	Bohmian	quantum	ontology?	Bohm suggested	that	it	is	natural	to	extend	the	quantum	ontology.	Just	as	there	is	a quantum	field	that	informs	the	particle,	there	can	be	a	super-quantum	field	that informs	the	first	order	quantum	field,	and	so	on	(Bohm	and	Hiley	1993:	379– The	place	of	mind 9 381).	Let	us	further	assume	that	the	information	contained	in	our	mental	states is	a	certain	part	of	this	hierarchy	of	fields.	Through	the	hierarchy,	mental	states could	then	guide	material	processes,	by	reaching	the	quantum	field	of	the particles	and	fields	in	the	brain	(Bohm	1990). How	exactly	might	such	"quantum	mental	causation"	work?	There	are currently	a	number	of	different	proposals	regarding	how	quantum	effects	might play	a	role	in	the	neurophysiological	processes	underlying	cognition	and	even consciousness	(see	Atmanspacher	2015;	Pylkkänen	2018). From	the	perspective of	the	ontological	interpretation	the	important	question	is	whether	there	are some	"quantum	sites"	in	the	brain	where	the	quantum	potential	can	have	a	nonnegligible	effect. Hiley	and	Pylkkänen	(2005)	discuss	one	such	possibility	by applying	the	quantum	potential	approach	to	Beck	and	Eccles's	(1992)	ideas about	the	role	of	quantum	mechanics	in	synaptic	exocytosis. Beck	and	Eccles suggested	that	the	appearance	of	low	transition	probabilities	in	synaptic exocytosis	implies	that	there	exists	an	activation	barrier	against	the	opening	of an	ion	channel	in	the	presynaptic	vesicular	grid.	Hiley	and	Pylkkänen	(2005:	212)	suggested	that	it	is	the	action	of	the	quantum	potential	that	effectively	reduces the	height	of	the	potential	barrier	to	increase	the	probability	of	exocytosis	(this is	an	example	of	quantum	tunneling). In	the	extended	ontological	interpretation the	higher	order	"mental"	fields	can	then	in	a	natural	way	influence	the	quantum potential	and	in	this	way	control	synaptic	exocytosis. Quantum	tunneling	in synaptic	communication	has	recently	been	discussed	in	detail	by	Danko	Georgiev (2018)	and	I	suggest	that	a	promising	way	to	develop	Bohmian	quantum	brain theory	further	is	to	examine	Georgiev's	proposals	in	the	light	of	the	richer picture	of	quantum	processes	that	the	ontological	interpretation	provides. Another	possibility	is	to	apply	the	Bohm	scheme	to	recent	proposals	that quantum	coherence	is	involved	in	ion	channel	conductivity	and	selectivity	(Salari et	al.	2017).	By	controlling	the	quantum	potential	in	the	ion	channels,	the	higherorder	mental	fields	might	then	be	able	to	control	the	triggering	of	action potentials.	Such	speculations	require	a	careful	consideration	of	the	problem	of decoherence. Alternatively,	one	might	look	in	the	light	of	the	ontological	interpretation at	Penrose	and	Hameroff's	proposal	that	consciousness	depends	on	biologically The	place	of	mind 10 "orchestrated"	coherent	quantum	processes	in	collections	of	microtubules	within brain	neurons.	Penrose	and	Hameroff	(unlike	Bohm	and	Hiley)	give	high importance	to	the	role	of	the	orchestrated	objective	reduction	(collapse)	of	the quantum	state	in	the	regulation	of	axonal	firings	and	the	control	of	conscious behavior	(see	Hameroff	and	Penrose	2014). In	the	ontological	interpretation such	regulation	would	take	place	through	the	higher-order	"mental"	fields orchestrating	the	quantum	potential	(which	need	not	involve	collapse). Let	us	summarize	Bohmian	mental	causation.	The	Bohm-Hiley	scheme	gives	a key	causal	role	to	information	at	the	quantum	level,	by	suggesting	that information	about	the	environment	of	the	quantum	particles	is	encoded	in	the wave	function	and	guides	the	particles. It	is	reasonable	to	postulate	a	hierarchy of	fields	of	information	in	complex	systems	such	as	brains.	If	free	will	and spontaneity	is	possible	at	the	higher	levels	of	information,	then	the	hierarchy enables	free	will	to	guide	physical	action.	The	principle	of	the	causal	closure	of the	physical	domain	needs	to	be	abandoned	or	else	modified	to	include (traditionally	non-physical)	causal	features	such	as	information	(for	a	more thorough	discussion,	see	Pylkkänen	2007;	2017). 5.	Conclusion:	two	kinds	of	mental	causation,	contra	the	received view	of	physicalism In	this	paper	we	first	considered	how	causal	anti-fundamentalism	suggests	a possible	route	to	mental	causation.	According	to	causal	anti-fundamentalism	the physical	world	is	not	governed	by	any	fundamental	relation	of	cause	and	effect. But	it	typically	assumes	that	fundamental	physical	facts	ground	causal	facts, including	those	involving	consciousness.	Conscious	experiences	can	then	be	seen as	local	events	which	determine	events	in	their	future. We	also	saw	that	there	are	reasons	to	think	that	causal	anti-fundamentalism is	incorrect. But	we	noted	that	there	is	another	way	to	challenge	the	received view,	namely	by	making	use	of	the	ontological	interpretation	of	quantum	theory. This	interpretation	suggests	that	information	plays	a	fundamental	causal	role	in the	physical	world.	We	argued	that	it	is	reasonable	to	assume	that	there	exists	a hierarchy	of	levels	of	information,	with	two-way	causal	influences	between The	place	of	mind 11 levels.	Mental/conscious	states	are	part	of	this	hierarchy	and	can	thus	causally affect	and	be	affected	by	physical	processes	at	lower	levels	of	the	hierarchy. In	this	short	paper	our	discussion	has	been	schematic,	and	many	of	the issues	need	to	be	explored	more	carefully	in	later	research. For	example,	how	to reconcile	the	suggestion	that	causality	can	be	eliminated	in	classical	physics, with	the	suggestion	that	it	cannot	be	eliminated	in	(usual)	quantum	mechanics (and	possibly	in	the	Bohm-Hiley	theory)?	Further,	the	Bohm-Hiley	theory	is	nonlocal,	so	what	is	the	role	of	causality	in	those	situations	where	a	non-local quantum	potential	has	a	non-negligible	effect	(e.g.	an	EPR-type	experiment;	cf. Fenton-Glynn	and	Kroedel	2015;	Walleczek	2016;	Musser	2015)? Acknowledgements Earlier	versions	of	this	paper	have	been	presented	at	the	Annual	Colloquium	of	the Philosophical	Society	of	Finland	in	Helsinki,	January	2018;	at	The	Science	of Consciousness	conference	in	Tucson,	USA,	April	2018;	at	the	Parmenides	Foundation workshop	"Rethinking	Matter,	Life	and	Mind",	Tegernsee,	Germany,	September	2018; and	at	the	"Scientific	metaphysics"	workshop	at	the	University	of	Helsinki,	January	2019. I	thank	the	participants	of	these	events	for	valuable	comments	and	questions.	The	work for	this	paper	was	partially	funded	by	the	Fetzer	Franklin	Fund	of	the	John	E.	Fetzer Memorial	Trust. References Andersen,	F.,	Anjum,	R.L.,	and	Mumford,	S.	(2018)	Causation	and	Quantum	Mechanics,	in R.L.	Anjum	and	S.	Mumford	What	Tends	to	Be.	The	Philosophy	of	Dispositional	Modality. London:	Routledge. Atmanspacher,	H.	(2015)	Quantum	Approaches	to	Consciousness,	ı	(Summer	2015 Edition),	E.	N.	Zalta	(ed.),	URL	= http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2015/entries/qt-consciousness/ Beck,	F.	and	Eccles,	J.	(1992)	Quantum	aspects	of	brain	activity	and	the	role	of consciousness.	Proceedings	of	the	National	Academy	of	Sciences	89	(23):	11357–11361. Blanchard,	T.	(2016)	Physics	and	causation.	Philosophy	Compass	11,	256-266. Bliss,	R.	and	Trogdon,	K.	(2016) Metaphysical	Grounding,	The	Stanford	Encyclopedia	of Philosophy	(Winter	2016	Edition),	E.	N.	Zalta	(ed.),	URL	= https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/grounding/ The	place	of	mind 12 Bohm,	D.	(1951)	Quantum	theory.	Englewood	Cliffs	NJ:	Prentice-Hall.	Dover	edition 1989. Bohm,	D.	(1957/1984)	Causality	and	Chance	in	Modern	Physics.	London:	Routledge. Bohm,	D.	(1990)	A	new	theory	of	the	relationship	of	mind	and	matter.	Philosophical Psychology	3,	pp.	271-286. Bohm,	D.	and	Hiley,	B.	J.	(1987)	An	Ontological	Basis	for	Quantum	Theory:	I.	Nonrelativistic	Particle	Systems,	Physics	Reports	144:	323–348. Bohm.	D.	and	Hiley,	B.J.	(1993)	The	Undivided	Universe:	An	Ontological	Interpretation	of Quantum	Theory.	London:	Routledge. Cartwright,	N.	(1979)	Causal	laws	and	effective	strategies.	Nous	13,	419-37. Fenton-Glynn,	L.	&	Kroedel,	T.	(2015).	Relativity,	quantum	entanglement, counterfactuals	and	causation.	British	Journal	for	the	Philosophy	of	Science	66	(1):	45-67. Frisch,	M.	(2012)	No	place	for	causes?	Causal	skepticism	in	physics.	Euro	Jnl	Phil	Sci	2: 331-336. Georgiev,	D.	(2018)	Quantum	Information	and	Consciousness:	A	Gentle	Introduction.	Boca Raton,	FL:	CRC	Press. Goff,	P.,	Seager,	W.	and	Allen-Hermanson,	S.	(2017)	Panpsychism,	The	Stanford Encyclopedia	of	Philosophy	(Winter	2017	Edition),	E.	N.	Zalta	(ed.),	URL	= https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2017/entries/panpsychism/ Goldstein,	S.	(2013)	Bohmian	Mechanics,	The	Stanford	Encyclopedia	of	Philosophy,	E.	N. Zalta	(ed.),	URL	=	http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2013/entries/qm-bohm/ Hameroff	&	Penrose	(2014)	Consciousness	in	the	universe:	A	review	of	the	'Orch	Or' theory.	Physics	of	Life	Reviews	11	(2014),	39-78 Hiley,	B.J.	and	Pylkkänen,	P.	(2005)	Can	mind	affect	matter	via	active	information?	Mind and	Matter	3	(2):	7–26,	URL	= http://www.mindmatter.de/resources/pdf/hileywww.pdf McGinn,	C.	(2006).	Hard	questions.	Journal	of	Consciousness	Studies	13	(10-11):	90-99. Musser,	G.	(2015)	Spooky	Action	at	a	Distance.	New	York:	Farrar,	Straus	and	Giroux. Price,	H.	and	Corry,	R.	(2007)	eds.	Causation,	Physics,	and	the	Constitution	of	Reality: Russell's	Republic	Revisited.	Oxford:	Clarendon	Press. Pylkkänen,	P.	(2007)	Mind,	Matter	and	the	Implicate	Order.	Heidelberg	and	New	York: Springer. Pylkkänen,	P.	(2017)	Is	there	room	in	quantum	ontology	for	a	genuine	causal	role	of consciousness?,	in	A.	Khrennikov	&	Emmanuel	Haven	eds.,	The	Palgrave	Handbook	of Quantum	Models	in	Social	Science.	London:	Palgrave	Macmillan. The	place	of	mind 13 Pylkkänen,	P.	(2018)	Quantum	Theories	of	Consciousness.	In	R.	Gennaro	(ed.)	The Routledge	Companion	to	Consciousness.	London:	Routledge. Pylkkänen,	P.	(forthcoming)	A	quantum	cure	for	panphobia.	In	W.	Seager	ed.	Routledge Handbook	of	Panpsychism.	London:	Routledge. Robb,	D.	and	Heil,	J.	(2018)	Mental	Causation.	The	Stanford	Encyclopedia	of	Philosophy,	E. N.	Zalta	ed.	(Winter	2018	Edition),	E.	N.	Zalta	(ed.),	forthcoming	URL	= <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2018/entries/mental-causation/>. Russell,	B.	(1913)	On	the	notion	of	cause.	Proceedings	of	the	Aristotelian	Society	13,	1-26. Salari,	V.,	Naeij,	H.	&	Shafiee,	A.	(2017).	Quantum	interference	and	selectivity	through biological	ion	channels.	Scientific	Reports	7:	41625. Strawson,	Galen	(2006).	'Realistic	monism	why	physicalism	entails	panpsychism'. Journal	of	Consciousness	Studies	13	(10-11):	pp.	3-31. Sundström,	P.	and	Vassen	B.	(2017)	Description	of	the	"Where	is	there	causation?"	workshop,	Umeå	University,	27-29	October	2017,	see https://philevents.org/event/show/34954 Walleczek,	J.	(2016)	The	Super-indeterminism	in	Orthodox	Quantum	Mechanics	Does Not	Implicate	the	Reality	of	Experimenter	Free	Will.	J.	Phys.:	Conf.	Ser.	701,	012005.